CHAPTER FIVECONCLUSIONThe value of the ARDF/COMINT mission, as conducted by USAF EC-47s in Southeast Asia, has been undeniably established and adequately documented. The future of the mission, in terms of doctrin, roles and missions, hardware, and evantual command and control, was, however, largely undetermined. This was not merely an Army/Air Force struggle for control of the mission; intestine differencies as to where the program belonged existed within the Air Force itself, stemming in great degree from the overlap in function between electronic warefare and reconnaissance. Hq 7AF's Assistant for Electronic Warfare outlined part of the complexity of the problem:
spelled out, but work is underway. New platforms, hardware, techniques, and training programs have not been provided for, except that studies are being undertaken and there is some R & D work going on. It is hard to tell which agency or agencies would operate and control a future Electronic War- fare program. The EC-47 with the "Q" console had the ability to jam or spoff enemy communications; this was an ECM function. Yet, unless the threat were to become such that it would be more advantageous to deny the enemy his communications, the airplane was more valuable as a finding-and fixing and data gathering platform. As things stood, the EC-47 was performing a reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission. Because of these many overlaps with attack, reconnaissance, pure ECM, and intelligence areas, no clear-cut doctrine for tactical electronic warfare had yet been established. For the duration of the Southeast Asia conflict, the question of who would control the ARDF/COMINT program could well become academic. The DEPSECDEF memo of 19 June 1968, and the CSAF and CSA agreement of 11 September 1967, respectively placed operational control of the ARDF function under COMUSMACV and held in abeyance a final decision on the future of the program. All of the effects might not be fully felt until after the Southeast Asia war was over, but, even while the conflict continued, some of them were becoming evident. The bulk of intelligence data gained were obtained by UASF sources, but because of their applicability to ground warfare in South Vietnam, most were reported and exploited by the Army, and all were retained in the 509th RRG technical data base by the Army. This meant that while the Air Force did the "collecting," the Army did the "keeping", and this "in-house keep" could conceivably provide them with a lever for expanding their fixed-wing capability in post-hostility years.
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