CHAPTER FIVECONCLUSIONThe Army's straight-line control of its own ARDF forces provided an impressive package, one which would look good on a briefing board in future years, even though the Air Force collection effort had far outstripped that of the Army. The Air Force operated with seperate front end and back end crews from the inception of the program. Because of difficulties encountered with the split operation, Aerospace Operational Doctrin manual, "Tactical Air Operations Electronic Warfare" (AFM 2-8), was revised to state:
forces. Specialists from other commands (e.g., USAFSS) may be added when required for specific time periods under agreements negotiated by TAC with the other com- mands. Regardless of how the forces finally are con- stituted, they are deployed as units. In SEA operations they are deployed as seperate units. "It brings up the organizational question of splitting responsibilities in an airborne intelligence activity between the 'operators' and 'collectors.'" Attempts have been made to change the situation, but, as of this date, the 460th TRW and the 6994th SS continued to work under a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA), which at least delineated the responsibilities of each organization. Air Force Manual 2-8 also stated:
Force component commander with the necessary orga- nization and equipment to plan, direct, and control all Air Force tactical air operations, including EW, and to coordinate these air operations with other services. Army requests for TEWS support are handled in the same manner as requests for other tactical air support. One can readily understand why the Deputy Secretary of Defense placed ARDF control under COMUSMACV to achieve centralized direction in a joint command, for the specific period of the war. At the same time, it could be anticipated that the Air Force might encounter difficulty in regaining the autonomy in EW opertions comtemplated by AFM 2-8. After all, the Army could claim full credit for the direction and control of the only existing ARDF and associated COMINT collection program for more than five years; and arguments against success are hard to muster.
|