Electric Goon

A History of the EC-47

Part 3: The EC-47 in Action—1967

© Joe Martin, 1998

Antique Airlines

By the end of 1966, Sanders Associates had turned over 30 of the originally programmed 47 Phyllis Ann aircraft to USAF ferry crews. By January 31, 1967, 29 were in Vietnam with 8 others en route. Eight more were scheduled to arrive in February-March, and 2 were earmarked for special tests. Six additional aircraft were designated to be equipped with the QRC-346 jamming system. The TEWS began to reach authorized strength and settled into a pattern of operations that would remain essentially unchanged for the duration of the war.

Although the nickname was applied specifically to the 360th TEWS, "Antique Airlines' would have been a fitting description of the entire EC47 program. The aircraft themselves were of 1942-45 vintage, and more than a few TEWS pilots had flown the Gooney Bird in World War Two. In early 1967, over 80% of the 360th's pilots and navigators were filed grade officers drawn from a variety of assignments all over the war. The average age was over 40 and the squadron claimed a law degree, 18 masters, and 36 bachelors degrees in various fields.

On January 17, 1967, a CBS television crew visited the 360th TEWS and filmed various scenes and squadron activities. The unofficial squadron emblem was prominently displayed, with "an old tiger, scarfed no less to keep out the chill, sitting in a rocking chair between the two roaring engines of the true and tried 'Douglas Racer'. " Excerpts of the film were televised on the evening news during the week of January 23-29.

Phyllis Ann and the SIGINT Community

Both ASA and USAFSS were parts of the overall SIGINT operations directed by the National Security Agency. (Some wags avowed that NSA stood for ‘No Such Agency’.) Throughout its existence, however, the ARDF program in Southeast Asia was a unique SIGINT operation. A top secret Phyllis Ann briefing (now declassified) reveals some subtle aspects of the program.

The briefing acknowledged that USAFSS was responsible for collecting communications intelligence (COMINT) "on the Soviet Union and other Communist countries of the world." To accomplish this mission, aircraft such as EC-130’s and EC-135’s were deployed as "airborne communications reconnaissance platforms (ARCP) in selected orbits along the periphery of Communist countries to obtain signals which are unobtainable from the ground." These collection assignments, "considered to be ‘National‘ in character" , were levied by NSA, which processed the intercepted material. ACRP was "basically a peacetime program", with the aircraft flown by SAC, TAC, or other USAF commands. The intercept operators, however, belonged to USAFSS, which was essentially the A ir Force's contribution to NSA. In the case of the EC-47, the TEWS were a part of TAC, but the 'backend' crews of Morse intercept operators and linguists were assigned the 6994th Security Squadron (USAFSS) and its detachments.

The Phyllis Ann briefing went on to explain that MACV required "a tactical platform which is immediately responsive to theatre requirements" which ACRP could not provide. Furthermore, ACRP aircraft were "not particularly well suited to in-country tactical operations." The C-47 had been chosen for the ARDF role "because they were available and they meet the requirements of [ relatively slow] speed and endurance." ARDF was emphatically not a part of ACRP, but "a separate and distinct program ", not controlled by NSA but "commanded and operated by 7 AF in response to MACV requirements."

Officially, the TEWS/USAFSS mission was:

To conduct daily, day/night all weather ARDF operations against enemy transmitters in the RVN [Republic of Vietnam] and permissive areas of Laos as a basis for tactical exploitation in support of requirements established by COMUSMACV and Commander, Seventh Air Force.

Seventh Air Force, through the TEWS, did of course own the EC-47 fleet but "MACV requirements", naturally enough, reflected the MACV command structure and that structure was dominated by the U.S. Army.

Controlling ARDF

Exactly where in Vietnam and other ‘permissive areas’ ARDF missions were to be flown was dictated by the needs of the various intelligence ‘consumers’, primarily the Army and Marine ground commanders. MACV J-2 (Intelligence) had the responsibility to "Receive, validate, and approve" requests for ARDF support. A coordinating committee made up of representatives of MACV, 7th Air Force, ASA, USAFSS and NSA met weekly to analyze and prioritize consumers’ requests. Once these priorities were established, the detailed planning was accomplished by an organization originally known as the Joint Platform Management Group, but which was later designated as the ARDF Coordination Center (ACC). The ACC established specific time over target, designated specific targets as ‘priority’, arranged for encryption of ARDF data for transmission to the consumer, and finally distributed the specific tasking to the TEWS and ASA units that would fly the mission.

As the TEWS were gearing up in the second half of 1966, ASA likewise increased its presence in Vietnam. On June 1, 1966, the 509th Radio Research Group (RRG) was established at Tan Son Nhut, replacing the 3rd RRU. Unlike the split responsibilities of the Air Force ARDF program, the 509th RRG controlled the entire Army operation from collection to analysis and dissemination of the finished intelligence product to the commander in the field. The flying part of the 509th’s mission was done by the 224th Aviation Battalion (Radio Research), under which were 4 aviation companies, one in each of the 4 Corps areas of South Vietnam.

A simplified diagram of the MACV ARDF operation is shown below. Changes of station were made and a TEWS detachment was established in Thailand in 1969, but the basic organizational structure remained in place until the 460th TRW stood down in late 1971.

Basic ARDF Command and Control Structure

The 509th also controlled ‘Direct Support Units’ (DSU) at the division or brigade level. The DSU had direct radio communication with the ARDF aircraft, whether Army or Air Force, and relayed the information to the field commander, sometimes within minutes after the fix was plotted. The Air Force might have wished it otherwise, but the EC-47 basically operated as a collection vehicle for the 509th RRG.

The Jungles of Puerto Rico

MACV may have called the planning shots, but the USAF continued to maintain that the EC-47 was a demonstrably better ARDF platform than the Army aural null system. Eventually, the Department of Defense and/or NSA decided to put matters to the test in a sort of "fly-off". These "Phase III" tests were conducted in Puerto Rico beginning around March 1, 1967. USAFSS radio operators and two pilots and two navigators from the 362nd TEWS were assigned on temporary duty (TDY), along with Sanders representatives and some maintenance personnel. The ASA contingent provided a pair of RU-8 aircraft. Aircraft 43-49547 was one of two EC-47's deployed, suitably emblazoned with a "Beat Army" motif on the nose. The overall operation was under the [presumably] neutral direction of a U.S. Navy officer.

David Eddy, one of the Hawk Eye project leaders, also participated in the Puerto Rico tests. He recalls that

We flew missions against Special Forces troops with jeep-mounted and back pack radios. Most of the transmissions were from vertical whips although some slant wires were used, and the duration of the signals varied from 30 seconds to 10 minutes. It isn't disputed that the AF got more fixes because we could do fly-bys instead of turning towards or away from the signal as the U-8 had to, being an aural null system. The AF was more effective against the shorter signals, and had a better overall accuracy. This is obvious in the data, but the political summation of the tests was that the systems were comparable.

A humorous aspect—as the tests went on, the Army team realized we knew the direction to the target immediately, so they would fly in close proximity to the Goon so they would know the direction to always turn nose to the target instead of tail to. I believe both services got to learn a lot about their system during the tests.

A summary report showed the average error of 124 [EC-47 ?] fixes to be 717 meters. Half of all fixes could be expected to be accurate within 600 meters. About 72 percent of targets would be within 1,000 meters of the reported location and only 10 percent would have errors greater than 1,500 meters.

The Air Force also conducted tests to determine how well the EC-47 could perform against horizontally polarized signals emitted from antennas suspended from balloons to eliminate ground effect. Holloman AFB, in the New Mexico desert, was the chosen test site. Again Dave Eddy:

Signal strength as well as bearing data was taken from 360 degrees around the antenna. We were able to verify that when off the end of the horizontal antenna, the bearings were fairly accurate, while the most inaccurate were when flying parallel to the antenna orientation. A definite drop in signal strength was noted as you approached abeam of the antenna. Efforts to mount several polarized antennas under the [EC-47] fuselage were unsuccessful, and it was decided that signal strength, when monitored by the X operator and the navigator, could provide insight into the antenna type. So, assuming the target was active long enough, you could evaluate each LOB [line of bearing] and its signal strength and make some assumptions as to its validity.

The lessons learned from the 1967 tests would be incorporated into the newer AN/ALR-35 system.

The Jungles of Vietnam

Initially, MACV had three objectives in 1967: To stop any attempted North Vietnamese invasion across the DMZ (I Corps), to block Communist infiltration through the Central Highlands in II Corps and to sweep enemy held areas in the III Corps areas north of Saigon. To accomplish this, a series of multi-brigade operations had been launched in late 1966. Some of these continued into the new year while new ones were continuously planned and executed. With good reason, Shelby M. Stanton in his book The Rise and Fall of an American Army would call 1967 "The year of the big battles". ARDF would play an increasingly important role in deciding when and where these battles would be fought.

In 1966, the USAF had supported 30 major ground operations and had flown 73,911strike and 86,928 reconnaissance sorties inside Vietnam. The fledgling TEWS contributed 1,146 'in-country' ARDF missions to the total, all in the last 6 months of the year. EC-47 sorties would increase dramatically in 1967 as the full complement of Electric Goons became operational.

Once the EC-47 crew had fixed a target, the information was passed as soon as possible to the assigned DSU. Once the ground commander had the fix information, a number of things might occur. The quotations in the following paragraphs are from a USAFSS paper dated June, 1968:

The tactical commanders react to the information differently, depending on the known significance of the target, the immediate tactical situation, and the proximity of the target to friendly military forces. Some commanders have ordered that a minimum of three rounds of heavy artillery be placed on each fix location. If the target is of known tactical significance, the commander may order an immediate tactical air strike against the location. It is also common practice to direct a forward air controller (FAC) into the area for reconnaissance purposes.

The results of a fix by a Phyllis Ann aircraft on November 21, 1966, provides a good illustration of timely use of ARDF data. The fix was received by the DSU at 0136Z and passed immediately to regimental intelligence. Roughly a half hour later, a FAC was sent to the area. Air strikes were requested and an 11th Armored Cavalry convoy moving along Route 1 was advised of a possible ambush. Four 'Huey' gunships were dispatched to the scene and began a 'recon by fire', which the enemy returned. A fire fight erupted, but a message sent afterwards noted " ----Important point, this ARDF prevented serious ambush for which this command is indebted to the COMINT community."

Although results were rarely this dramatic, they were no less important. Again quoting from the USAFSS paper:

In some cases a study of ARDF fixes obtained within a given area has been the sole basis for conducting an operation. The planned area of operations has often been altered during the operation based on ARDF information. Tactical commanders rely heavily on ARDF data for planning troop maneuvers and fire support. Also, it is possible, to a large degree, for the commanders to measure the effectiveness of their actions through ARDF.

Heavy use was made of ARDF information in both planning and executing Operation Junction City, which was at the time the largest operation conducted in Vietnam. Twenty-two battalions from the U.S.1st, 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions, 196th Infantry Brigade, 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th Armored Cavalry, along with 4 ARVN battalions, spent nearly three months sweeping the long-time VC stronghold known as War Zone C northwest of Saigon. Some 4,400 fixes were obtained, of which 2,772 were of classified as 'immediate interest'.

These kinds of results were impressive, but the USAFSS study noted that "This close tactical support (CTS) is largely incidental since ARDF operations are conducted daily in most areas within MACV jurisdiction." ARDF was also frequently used to target B-52 'Arc Light' strikes.

Ninety percent of the B-52 strikes targeted by the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force in the DMZ area were purported to be based on ARDF.

The table below, complied from various sources, gives some indication of the magnitude of ARDF CTS for ground operations specifically mentioned in USAFSS and/or TEWS documents. The number of B-52 strikes has been included as a point of interest since it seems reasonable to conclude that a fair proportion of them must have been precipitated by ARDF. 

For the EC-47 crews who flew in 1967-68, a fair amount of feedback material such as that shown in the tables above is contained in USAFSS and/or TEWS documents of that period. Names of crewmen are given, along with a brief description on what action was taken on the fixes they obtained. For example, on December 6, 1967, the crew of Quintanna, Johnson, Warren, Veal and Harris fixed an enemy unit "which may have been involved in the attack on the 199th Light Infantry Brigade forces north of Bien Hoa." Artillery was fired into the area and a patrol was inserted. When the patrol was extracted later in the day, it received heavy fire, wounding the helicopter pilot.

Unfortunately, these reports appear to name only the TEWS or 6994th crews, not both. The example above could list a bare minimum crew of pilot, co-pilot, navigator and 2 radio operators, but that seems doubtful since during this time the TEWS flight mechanic/engineers were still carried. More likely, the fifth man was an instructor or Standardization/Evaluation Flight Examiner (SEFE) accompanying a normal TEWS or 4-man USAFSS backend crew.

Modification 2000

The possibility of 4 radio operators aboard the Electric Goon resulted from the continued success of the two Drill Press aircraft. These were often deployed to Hue/Phu Bai in the I Corps area, within easy flying distance of the DMZ and surrounding areas. Beginning in August, the 360th TEWS augmented the Drill Press effort by rotating a pair of ARDF aircraft to Phu Bai.

To provide for more Drill Press-type collection capability, WRAMA was directed to undertook modification of 30 Phyllis Ann aircraft to include the 'Group A' wiring and other modifications necessary to support 2 more intercept consoles. Known as "Z" positions, they were similar to the existing "Y" console except that one of the HF receivers was replaced by a VHF receiver. Tape recorders were included and the rearmost Z position, on the right side of the aisle just forward of the cargo door, was equipped with an MC-88 typewriter for transcription of Morse intercepts.

Like the original Phyllis Ann project, WRAMA generally referred to this one by its sequential project number, thus becoming known as 'Modification 2000'. Some aircraft were modified prior to deployment, while others were modified 'in theatre'. Initially on 24 Z consoles were procured, which meant that only 12 of the 30 aircraft could operate as "Z birds" at any given time. The 362nd TEWS reported the last Mod 2000 complete on January 19, 1968.

Other Missions

On January 31, 1967, 'Antique Airlines' demonstrated ARDF capability of another sort. At 1620 hours, 'Dragon 94' picked up the emergency beeper signal from a downed Army helicopter. A fix was made approximately 18 miles west of Phan Rang. The EC-47 crew notified Phan Rang tower then proceeded to the fix location. The Electric Goon orbited the downed chopper, which was still taking enemy fire, and helped direct a USAF rescue helicopter and 4 Army gunships that had arrived to provide cover. At 1650 the Air Force helicopter was seen to take 5 people aboard and by 1700 the remaining 5 had also been extracted. The entire operation had taken just 40 minutes from the time Dragon 94 picked up the beeper signal.

To disguise its ARDF mission, the EC-47 was modified by replacing the rearmost right-hand window with a leaflet chute. While trolling for enemy radio signals, psychological warfare leaflets were scattered over the countryside in prodigious quantities—the 360th TEWS reported dropping over 32 million the in first quarter of 1967 alone! The cover was credible, since other C-47's were in fact assigned this mission full-time, tagged with the sobriquet "Bullshit bombers". A variety of these leaflets were printed, but all were aimed at convincing the communist soldier to lay down his weapons and turn to the open arms of the American or ARVN forces. The leaflets, some in comic-strip form, usually contained a 'safe conduct' pass on one side. As the war went on, the TEWS eventually discontinued the leaflet dropping exercise.

The Loss of Tide 86

The EC-47 fleet suffered its first loss on February 18, 1967, when an Air America C-46 suffered brake failure after landing at Tan Son Nhut and ground looped into the revetment where aircraft 43-49679 was parked. Fortunately, no one was near the EC-47 and no injuries occurred to the C-46 passengers or crew, but 679 was a write-off.

But It was, after all, a war and casualties would occur. The inevitable happened on March 9. 'Tide 86', RC-47 [before the designation was changed to EC-47] 43-49201 of the 361st TEWS departed Nha Trang at 1425 hrs local time. Estimated time of arrival (ETA) back at base was 2055 hours. When the aircraft failed to return as scheduled, a communications search was initiated but yielded no results. Shortly before midnight, search and rescue operations were notified that Tide 86 was missing. Bad weather hampered visual search efforts, but at approximately 0810 on March 11, an O-1 FAC spotted the wreckage.

By mid afternoon, the area had been secured and a joint 361st/6994th team was lifted to the site by helicopter. The wreckage was on hillside, approximately 200 feet below the ridge. The aircraft appeared to have been in a climbing left turn. The left wing was torn off and the forward half of the aircraft was torn apart, scattered and burned. The rear portion of the fuselage lay 140 feet down valley in an inverted position, badly torn apart but not burned.

The enemy had "thoroughly combed the area stripping valuables, survival gear, boots and socks, side arms, gun box and canteens." Leaflets were scattered about the crash site and evidently served their intended purpose—the ARDF equipment did not appear to have been tampered with. The bodies of all 7 crew members were recovered and an Army demolition team destroyed the remains of Tide 86.

The loss of Tide 86 prompted a change in EC-47 operating procedures. Nine Electric Goons had been hit by ground fire since the inception of the program, and after this loss minimum operational altitude was set at 2,000 feet above ground level (AGL).

Summary, the First Full Year At the end of 1967, the TEWS and the 6994th Security Squadron could look on their accomplishments with some pride. The Electric Goon had firmly established itself as a major weapon in the intelligence war. Direct support of ground operations inside Vietnam remained a major focus of ARDF operations, but 1967 also saw increased emphasis on "out country" operations, mostly over the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos.

In February, a special ARDF area had been assigned to the 362nd TEWS. This area, off the coast of North Vietnam, paralleled the "Tally Ho" interdiction zone which ran from the MZ to a line approximately 30 miles north. (This ARDF area was later discontinued.)

In the last months of 1967, U.S. intelligence noted a change in enemy tactics. PAVN/VC forces had gone on the attack , and with increased force size. A series of battles erupted along Special Forces outposts in the sparsely populated highlands near the borders with Laos and Cambodia. The Marines had also established a combat base on a little plateau overlooking the old colonial Route 9, which ran just below the DMZ from the Vietnamese coast west to the Laotian border. Enemy activity was particularly heavy thereabouts, and before many more months were out this obscure spot would be forever etched in American military history. The Marine stronghold took its name from the nearby village, a little place called Khe Sanh.

David Eddy quite likely has a broader knowledge of EC-47 activities than anybody on earth, and he has been most generous in answering my questions. The story of the EC-47 can be told in considerably more detail thanks to his input.

Dennis Buley contributed the "Beat Army" photo, which was taken by ARDF pioneer Herb Hovey. (Dennis is the webmaster for the Army Special Electronics Mission Aircraft site—well worth a visit.)

The anecdote concerning fixing of a beeper signal comes straight from the 360thTEWS history, but I do not recall the EC-47 having this capability. Both UHF (243.0 MHz) and VHF (121.5 MHz) "guard" channels were well beyond the range of the AN/ALR-34/35 systems. There was, as I recall, also an HF guard frequency, but I don't believe the standard survival radio operated on HF. Can anyone explain?

Tet and Beyond

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