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Electric Goon
A History of the EC-47
Part 3: The EC-47 in Action—1967
© Joe Martin, 1998
Antique Airlines
By the end of 1966, Sanders Associates had turned over 30 of the originally
programmed 47 Phyllis Ann aircraft to USAF ferry crews. By January 31, 1967,
29 were in Vietnam with 8 others en route. Eight more were scheduled to
arrive in February-March, and 2 were earmarked for special tests. Six
additional aircraft were designated to be equipped with the QRC-346 jamming
system. The TEWS began to reach authorized strength and settled into a
pattern of operations that would remain essentially unchanged for the
duration of the war.
Although the nickname was applied specifically to the 360th TEWS, "Antique
Airlines' would have been a fitting description of the entire EC47 program.
The aircraft themselves were of 1942-45 vintage, and more than a few TEWS
pilots had flown the Gooney Bird in World War Two. In early 1967, over 80%
of the 360th's pilots and navigators were filed grade officers drawn from a
variety of assignments all over the war. The average age was over 40 and the
squadron claimed a law degree, 18 masters, and 36 bachelors degrees in
various fields.
On January 17, 1967, a CBS television crew visited the 360th TEWS and filmed
various scenes and squadron activities. The unofficial squadron emblem was
prominently displayed, with "an old tiger, scarfed no less to keep out the
chill, sitting in a rocking chair between the two roaring engines of the true
and tried 'Douglas Racer'. " Excerpts of the film were televised on the
evening news during the week of January 23-29.
Phyllis Ann and the SIGINT Community
Both ASA and USAFSS were parts of the overall SIGINT operations directed by
the National Security Agency. (Some wags avowed that NSA stood for ‘No Such
Agency’.) Throughout its existence, however, the ARDF program in Southeast
Asia was a unique SIGINT operation. A top secret Phyllis Ann briefing
(now declassified) reveals some subtle aspects of the program.
The briefing acknowledged that USAFSS was responsible for collecting
communications intelligence (COMINT) "on the Soviet Union and other Communist
countries of the world." To accomplish this mission, aircraft such as
EC-130’s and EC-135’s were deployed as "airborne communications reconnaissance
platforms (ARCP) in selected orbits along the periphery of Communist countries
to obtain signals which are unobtainable from the ground." These collection
assignments, "considered to be ‘National‘ in character" , were levied by NSA,
which processed the intercepted material. ACRP was "basically a peacetime
program", with the aircraft flown by SAC, TAC, or other USAF commands. The
intercept operators, however, belonged to USAFSS, which was essentially the A
ir Force's contribution to NSA. In the case of the EC-47, the TEWS were a
part of TAC, but the 'backend' crews of Morse intercept operators and linguists
were assigned the 6994th Security Squadron (USAFSS) and its detachments.
The Phyllis Ann briefing went on to explain that MACV required "a tactical
platform which is immediately responsive to theatre requirements" which ACRP
could not provide. Furthermore, ACRP aircraft were "not particularly well
suited to in-country tactical operations." The C-47 had been chosen for the
ARDF role "because they were available and they meet the requirements of [
relatively slow] speed and endurance." ARDF was emphatically not a
part of ACRP, but "a separate and distinct program ", not controlled by NSA
but "commanded and operated by 7 AF in response to MACV requirements."
Officially, the TEWS/USAFSS mission was:
To conduct daily, day/night all weather ARDF operations against enemy
transmitters in the RVN [Republic of Vietnam] and permissive areas of Laos
as a basis for tactical exploitation in support of requirements established
by COMUSMACV and Commander, Seventh Air Force.
Seventh Air Force, through the TEWS, did of course own the EC-47 fleet but
"MACV requirements", naturally enough, reflected the MACV command structure
and that structure was dominated by the U.S. Army.
Controlling ARDF
Exactly where in Vietnam and other ‘permissive areas’ ARDF missions
were to be flown was dictated by the needs of the various intelligence
‘consumers’, primarily the Army and Marine ground commanders. MACV J-2
(Intelligence) had the responsibility to "Receive, validate, and approve"
requests for ARDF support. A coordinating committee made up of representatives
of MACV, 7th Air Force, ASA, USAFSS and NSA met weekly to analyze and
prioritize consumers’ requests. Once these priorities were established, the
detailed planning was accomplished by an organization originally known as the
Joint Platform Management Group, but which was later designated as the ARDF
Coordination Center (ACC). The ACC established specific time over target,
designated specific targets as ‘priority’, arranged for encryption of ARDF
data for transmission to the consumer, and finally distributed the specific
tasking to the TEWS and ASA units that would fly the mission.
As the TEWS were gearing up in the second half of 1966, ASA likewise increased
its presence in Vietnam. On June 1, 1966, the 509th Radio Research Group
(RRG) was established at Tan Son Nhut, replacing the 3rd RRU. Unlike the
split responsibilities of the Air Force ARDF program, the 509th RRG controlled
the entire Army operation from collection to analysis and dissemination of
the finished intelligence product to the commander in the field. The flying
part of the 509th’s mission was done by the 224th Aviation Battalion (Radio
Research), under which were 4 aviation companies, one in each of the 4 Corps
areas of South Vietnam.
A simplified diagram of the MACV ARDF operation is shown below. Changes of
station were made and a TEWS detachment was established in Thailand in 1969,
but the basic organizational structure remained in place until the 460th TRW
stood down in late 1971.
Basic ARDF Command and Control Structure
The 509th also controlled ‘Direct Support Units’ (DSU) at the division or
brigade level. The DSU had direct radio communication with the ARDF aircraft,
whether Army or Air Force, and relayed the information to the field commander,
sometimes within minutes after the fix was plotted. The Air Force might have
wished it otherwise, but the EC-47 basically operated as a collection vehicle
for the 509th RRG.
The Jungles of Puerto Rico
MACV may have called the planning shots, but the USAF continued to maintain
that the EC-47 was a demonstrably better ARDF platform than the Army aural
null system. Eventually, the Department of Defense and/or NSA decided to put
matters to the test in a sort of "fly-off". These "Phase III" tests were
conducted in Puerto Rico beginning around March 1, 1967. USAFSS radio operators
and two pilots and two navigators from the 362nd TEWS were assigned on
temporary duty (TDY), along with Sanders representatives and some maintenance
personnel. The ASA contingent provided a pair of RU-8 aircraft. Aircraft
43-49547 was one of two EC-47's deployed, suitably emblazoned with a "Beat
Army" motif on the nose. The overall operation was under the [presumably]
neutral direction of a U.S. Navy officer.
David Eddy, one of the Hawk Eye project leaders, also participated in the
Puerto Rico tests. He recalls that
We flew missions against Special Forces troops with jeep-mounted and back
pack radios. Most of the transmissions were from vertical whips although some
slant wires were used, and the duration of the signals varied from 30 seconds
to 10 minutes. It isn't disputed that the AF got more fixes because we could
do fly-bys instead of turning towards or away from the signal as the U-8 had
to, being an aural null system. The AF was more effective against the shorter
signals, and had a better overall accuracy. This is obvious in the data, but
the political summation of the tests was that the systems were comparable.
A humorous aspect—as the tests went on, the Army team realized we knew the
direction to the target immediately, so they would fly in close proximity to
the Goon so they would know the direction to always turn nose to the target
instead of tail to. I believe both services got to learn a lot about their
system during the tests.
A summary report showed the average error of 124 [EC-47 ?] fixes to be 717
meters. Half of all fixes could be expected to be accurate within 600 meters.
About 72 percent of targets would be within 1,000 meters of the reported
location and only 10 percent would have errors greater than 1,500 meters.
The Air Force also conducted tests to determine how well the EC-47 could
perform against horizontally polarized signals emitted from antennas suspended
from balloons to eliminate ground effect. Holloman AFB, in the New Mexico
desert, was the chosen test site. Again Dave Eddy:
Signal strength as well as bearing data was taken from 360 degrees around
the antenna. We were able to verify that when off the end of the horizontal
antenna, the bearings were fairly accurate, while the most inaccurate were
when flying parallel to the antenna orientation. A definite drop in signal
strength was noted as you approached abeam of the antenna. Efforts to mount
several polarized antennas under the [EC-47] fuselage were unsuccessful, and
it was decided that signal strength, when monitored by the X operator and
the navigator, could provide insight into the antenna type. So, assuming the
target was active long enough, you could evaluate each LOB
[line of bearing] and its signal strength and make some assumptions as to its
validity.
The lessons learned from the 1967 tests would be incorporated into the newer
AN/ALR-35 system.
The Jungles of Vietnam
Initially, MACV had three objectives in 1967: To stop any attempted North
Vietnamese invasion across the DMZ (I Corps), to block Communist infiltration
through the Central Highlands in II Corps and to sweep enemy held areas in
the III Corps areas north of Saigon. To accomplish this, a series of
multi-brigade operations had been launched in late 1966. Some of these
continued into the new year while new ones were continuously planned and
executed. With good reason, Shelby M. Stanton in his book The Rise and
Fall of an American Army would call 1967 "The year of the big battles".
ARDF would play an increasingly important role in deciding when and where
these battles would be fought.
In 1966, the USAF had supported 30 major ground operations and had flown
73,911strike and 86,928 reconnaissance sorties inside Vietnam. The fledgling
TEWS contributed 1,146 'in-country' ARDF missions to the total, all in the
last 6 months of the year. EC-47 sorties would increase dramatically in 1967
as the full complement of Electric Goons became operational.
Once the EC-47 crew had fixed a target, the information was passed as soon
as possible to the assigned DSU. Once the ground commander had the fix
information, a number of things might occur. The quotations in the following
paragraphs are from a USAFSS paper dated June, 1968:
The tactical commanders react to the information differently, depending on
the known significance of the target, the immediate tactical situation, and
the proximity of the target to friendly military forces. Some commanders have
ordered that a minimum of three rounds of heavy artillery be placed on each
fix location. If the target is of known tactical significance, the commander
may order an immediate tactical air strike against the location. It is also
common practice to direct a forward air controller (FAC) into the area for
reconnaissance purposes.
The results of a fix by a Phyllis Ann aircraft on November 21, 1966, provides
a good illustration of timely use of ARDF data. The fix was received by the
DSU at 0136Z and passed immediately to regimental intelligence. Roughly a
half hour later, a FAC was sent to the area. Air strikes were requested and
an 11th Armored Cavalry convoy moving along Route 1 was advised of a possible
ambush. Four 'Huey' gunships were dispatched to the scene and began a 'recon
by fire', which the enemy returned. A fire fight erupted, but a message sent
afterwards noted " ----Important point, this ARDF prevented serious ambush
for which this command is indebted to the COMINT community."
Although results were rarely this dramatic, they were no less important.
Again quoting from the USAFSS paper:
In some cases a study of ARDF fixes obtained within a given area has been the
sole basis for conducting an operation. The planned area of operations has
often been altered during the operation based on ARDF information. Tactical
commanders rely heavily on ARDF data for planning troop maneuvers and fire
support. Also, it is possible, to a large degree, for the commanders to
measure the effectiveness of their actions through ARDF.
Heavy use was made of ARDF information in both planning and executing
Operation Junction City, which was at the time the largest operation conducted
in Vietnam. Twenty-two battalions from the U.S.1st, 4th and 25th Infantry
Divisions, 196th Infantry Brigade, 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 11th
Armored Cavalry, along with 4 ARVN battalions, spent nearly three months
sweeping the long-time VC stronghold known as War Zone C northwest of Saigon.
Some 4,400 fixes were obtained, of which 2,772 were of classified as
'immediate interest'.
These kinds of results were impressive, but the USAFSS study noted that
"This close tactical support (CTS) is largely incidental since ARDF operations
are conducted daily in most areas within MACV jurisdiction." ARDF was also
frequently used to target B-52 'Arc Light' strikes.
Ninety percent of the B-52 strikes targeted by the 3rd Marine Amphibious
Force in the DMZ area were purported to be based on ARDF.
The table below, complied from various sources, gives some indication of the
magnitude of ARDF CTS for ground operations specifically mentioned in USAFSS
and/or TEWS documents. The number of B-52 strikes has been included as a
point of interest since it seems reasonable to conclude that a fair proportion
of them must have been precipitated by ARDF.
For the EC-47 crews who flew in 1967-68, a fair amount of feedback material
such as that shown in the tables above is contained in USAFSS and/or TEWS
documents of that period. Names of crewmen are given, along with a brief
description on what action was taken on the fixes they obtained. For example,
on December 6, 1967, the crew of Quintanna, Johnson, Warren, Veal and Harris
fixed an enemy unit "which may have been involved in the attack on the 199th
Light Infantry Brigade forces north of Bien Hoa." Artillery was fired into
the area and a patrol was inserted. When the patrol was extracted later in
the day, it received heavy fire, wounding the helicopter pilot.
Unfortunately, these reports appear to name only the TEWS or 6994th crews,
not both. The example above could list a bare minimum crew of pilot,
co-pilot, navigator and 2 radio operators, but that seems doubtful since
during this time the TEWS flight mechanic/engineers were still carried. More
likely, the fifth man was an instructor or Standardization/Evaluation Flight
Examiner (SEFE) accompanying a normal TEWS or 4-man USAFSS backend crew.
Modification 2000
The possibility of 4 radio operators aboard the Electric Goon resulted from
the continued success of the two Drill Press aircraft. These were often
deployed to Hue/Phu Bai in the I Corps area, within easy flying distance of
the DMZ and surrounding areas. Beginning in August, the 360th TEWS augmented
the Drill Press effort by rotating a pair of ARDF aircraft to Phu Bai.
To provide for more Drill Press-type collection capability, WRAMA was
directed to undertook modification of 30 Phyllis Ann aircraft to include
the 'Group A' wiring and other modifications necessary to support 2 more
intercept consoles. Known as "Z" positions, they were similar to the existing
"Y" console except that one of the HF receivers was replaced by a VHF
receiver. Tape recorders were included and the rearmost Z position, on the
right side of the aisle just forward of the cargo door, was equipped with an
MC-88 typewriter for transcription of Morse intercepts.
Like the original Phyllis Ann project, WRAMA generally referred to this one
by its sequential project number, thus becoming known as 'Modification 2000'.
Some aircraft were modified prior to deployment, while others were modified
'in theatre'. Initially on 24 Z consoles were procured, which meant that only
12 of the 30 aircraft could operate as "Z birds" at any given time. The 362nd
TEWS reported the last Mod 2000 complete on January 19, 1968.
Other Missions
On January 31, 1967, 'Antique Airlines' demonstrated ARDF capability of
another sort. At 1620 hours, 'Dragon 94' picked up the emergency beeper
signal from a downed Army helicopter. A fix was made approximately 18 miles
west of Phan Rang. The EC-47 crew notified Phan Rang tower then proceeded to
the fix location. The Electric Goon orbited the downed chopper, which was
still taking enemy fire, and helped direct a USAF rescue helicopter and 4
Army gunships that had arrived to provide cover. At 1650 the Air Force
helicopter was seen to take 5 people aboard and by 1700 the remaining 5 had
also been extracted. The entire operation had taken just 40 minutes from the
time Dragon 94 picked up the beeper signal.
To disguise its ARDF mission, the EC-47 was modified by replacing the
rearmost right-hand window with a leaflet chute. While trolling for enemy
radio signals, psychological warfare leaflets were scattered over the
countryside in prodigious quantities—the 360th TEWS reported dropping over
32 million the in first quarter of 1967 alone! The cover was credible, since
other C-47's were in fact assigned this mission full-time, tagged with the
sobriquet "Bullshit bombers". A variety of these leaflets were printed, but
all were aimed at convincing the communist soldier to lay down his weapons
and turn to the open arms of the American or ARVN forces. The leaflets, some
in comic-strip form, usually contained a 'safe conduct' pass on one side. As
the war went on, the TEWS eventually discontinued the leaflet dropping
exercise.
The Loss of Tide 86
The EC-47 fleet suffered its first loss on February 18, 1967, when an Air
America C-46 suffered brake failure after landing at Tan Son Nhut and ground
looped into the revetment where aircraft 43-49679 was parked. Fortunately,
no one was near the EC-47 and no injuries occurred to the C-46 passengers or
crew, but 679 was a write-off.
But It was, after all, a war and casualties would occur. The inevitable
happened on March 9. 'Tide 86', RC-47 [before the designation was changed
to EC-47] 43-49201 of the 361st TEWS departed Nha Trang at 1425 hrs local
time. Estimated time of arrival (ETA) back at base was 2055 hours. When the
aircraft failed to return as scheduled, a communications search was initiated
but yielded no results. Shortly before midnight, search and rescue operations
were notified that Tide 86 was missing. Bad weather hampered visual search
efforts, but at approximately 0810 on March 11, an O-1 FAC spotted the
wreckage.
By mid afternoon, the area had been secured and a joint 361st/6994th team
was lifted to the site by helicopter. The wreckage was on hillside,
approximately 200 feet below the ridge. The aircraft appeared to have been
in a climbing left turn. The left wing was torn off and the forward half of
the aircraft was torn apart, scattered and burned. The rear portion of the
fuselage lay 140 feet down valley in an inverted position, badly torn apart
but not burned.
The enemy had "thoroughly combed the area stripping valuables, survival
gear, boots and socks, side arms, gun box and canteens." Leaflets were
scattered about the crash site and evidently served their intended
purpose—the ARDF equipment did not appear to have been tampered with. The
bodies of all 7 crew members were recovered and an Army demolition team
destroyed the remains of Tide 86.
The loss of Tide 86 prompted a change in EC-47 operating procedures. Nine
Electric Goons had been hit by ground fire since the inception of the
program, and after this loss minimum operational altitude was set at 2,000
feet above ground level (AGL).
Summary, the First Full Year
At the end of 1967, the TEWS and the 6994th Security Squadron could look on
their accomplishments with some pride. The Electric Goon had firmly
established itself as a major weapon in the intelligence war. Direct support
of ground operations inside Vietnam remained a major focus of ARDF operations,
but 1967 also saw increased emphasis on "out country" operations, mostly over
the Ho Chi Minh trail in southern Laos.
In February, a special ARDF area had been assigned to the 362nd TEWS. This
area, off the coast of North Vietnam, paralleled the "Tally Ho" interdiction
zone which ran from the MZ to a line approximately 30 miles north. (This ARDF
area was later discontinued.)
In the last months of 1967, U.S. intelligence noted a change in enemy tactics.
PAVN/VC forces had gone on the attack , and with increased force size. A
series of battles erupted along Special Forces outposts in the sparsely
populated highlands near the borders with Laos and Cambodia. The Marines had
also established a combat base on a little plateau overlooking the old
colonial Route 9, which ran just below the DMZ from the Vietnamese coast west
to the Laotian border. Enemy activity was particularly heavy thereabouts, and
before many more months were out this obscure spot would be forever etched in
American military history. The Marine stronghold took its name from the nearby
village, a little place called Khe Sanh.
David Eddy quite likely has a broader knowledge of EC-47 activities than
anybody on earth, and he has been most generous in answering my questions.
The story of the EC-47 can be told in considerably more detail thanks to his
input.
Dennis Buley contributed the "Beat Army" photo, which was taken by ARDF
pioneer Herb Hovey. (Dennis is the webmaster for the Army Special Electronics
Mission Aircraft site—well worth a visit.)
The anecdote concerning fixing of a beeper signal comes straight from the
360thTEWS history, but I do not recall the EC-47 having this capability.
Both UHF (243.0 MHz) and VHF (121.5 MHz) "guard" channels were well beyond
the range of the AN/ALR-34/35 systems. There was, as I recall, also an HF
guard frequency, but I don't believe the standard survival radio operated on
HF. Can anyone explain?
Tet and Beyond
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