Forward

The function of the program--that of locating and fixing the positions of low- powered enemy transmitters, and of gathering intelligence from these emmissions, in a near-real-time sense - remains the same as of this writing. The operation, with the exception of the acitvities of an EC-47 detachment at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, had previously been called "Combat Cougar". Because of a suspected compromise of the nickname, the project was renamed "Combat Cross" by CSAF message 251548Z June 1970, and all references to the program in this report will reflect the change. The Thai-based detachment, operating exclusively over Laos, was designated Commando Forge."

The sensitive nature of some aspects of the Combat Cross/Commando Forge mission has acted as a restraint on any acknowledgment of the degree of success achieved by the ARDF function, but unofficial comment by ground commanders benefitting from its real-time electronic reconnaissance has invaribly been highly favorable. Within the limitations imposed by the need to protect sensitive information, this CHECO report documents the operations, functions, organizational changes, and achievements of the USAF/ARDF function in SEA from April 1968 through July, 1970.

Lessons learned in World War II and Korea were rapidly forgotten or, perhaps, "neglected" is a better word. Because of sevurity considerations or because of the lack of glamor often necessarily resulting from this cloak, such valuable techniques as Airborne Radio Direction Finding appear to "get lost" in the aftermath of a conflict. (These words were paraphrassed from a 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing reprort, "A Critical Review of the ARDF Operations in SEA.") It is hoped that this CHECO report, along with the previous report, "The EC-47 in Southeast Asia," will help keep this valuable asset alive and subject to continued review and analysis relative to its role in tactical air warfare.

Although in theory the UASF and the U.S. Army jointly supported the ARDF/COMINT role in SEA equally, USAF efforts provided 70 to 75 percent of real-time fixing of enemy radio transmittions to field commanders. Nevertheless, because of an agreement between the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff, any doctrinal issues arising from this seeming imbalance would have to wait until the end of the SEA comflict for resolution.