CHECO Report September 1970, Page 20

CHAPTER FOUR

OPERATIONS

EFFECTIVENESS

The file of such favorable communications was voluminous, but those quoted surffice to show the value placed by Headquaters, MACV, the radio research units, the direct support units and the field commanders upon the USAF ARDF/COMINT accomplishments in Southeast Asia.

Another measure of effectiveness was through assessing the ability of the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons to fly the missions and cover thier target areas. Much of the value derived from ARDF>COMINT stemmed from the continuity of missions identifying and following enemy units, keeping track of their locations and relocations, their advances and retreats -- and from the consequent ability to establish an Order of Battle (08) without gaps or significant lapses. A scheduled mission not flown could "lose" an enemy unit, and reacquiring it could prove time-consuming: while the "lost" unit could pose a threat to friendly forces unaware of its location. Therefore, comparing missions flown against missions scheduled, and comparing "flying hours over target" with "hours over target requested" yielded another valid yardstick of operational effectiveness. The following eight-month In-Country Combat Sortie Summary for EC-47s shows part of the picture (the term EFFECT compares sorties over target with sorties scheduled, and is in direct alignment with target hours flown versus target hours requested):

                                                INEFFECT INEFFECT
        SCHED  CANX  FLOWN   DAY  NIGHT  EFFECT  WEATHER  OTHER
JUN 70   535     6    529    483    46     503       3      23

MAY      818     8    810    653   157     758       8      44

APR      742     4    738    658    80     695       0      43

MAR      816     8    808    741    67     777       0      31

FEB      740     2    738    636   102     697       0      41

JAN      852     2    850    677   173     840       0      10

DEC 69   903     7    896    706   190     876       1      19

NOV      992    33    959    821   138     934       3      22

TOTAL 6398 70 6328 5375 953 6080 15 233
PERCENT 100.0 1.1 98.9 84.0 14.9 95.0 0.23 3.64

So, of all the missions scheduled during the eight month period, 98.9 percent were flown. Of perhaps more importance was that of all the flying hours over target requested, 95.02 percent were accomplished by the TEWS. This figure continued to be maintained as of this writing.

Total sorties, by country and area, flown after July 1968, were as follows: South Vietnam, 25,460 (84.03%); Barrel Roll, 1,131 (3.73%); Steel Tiger, 2,490 (8.21%); North Vietnam, 708 (2.33%): Cambodia, 507 (1.67%), and one mission flown over Thailand in June 1970. No North Vietnam (Area 17) missions were flown after September 1969. In all, 30,297 TEWS ARDF sorties were flown during the two years.

The above figures cannot indicate whether individual mission objectives were met in each and every case. However, by both yardsticks -- statistical data and and customer feedback-- the EC-47 ARDF/COMINT efforts in Southeast Asia earned a high rating. In consumer satisfaction was a criterion of success, the glowing reports fed back by the customers attested to its achievement. If getting the aircraft into the air and over the target measured effictiveness, then the Combat Sortie Summary offered corroboration. One last indication of their usefulness is to be found in the fact that even while other units and activities were already phasing down, the EC-47 TEWS grew to their greatest UE and assigned aircraft totals of the war.

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