At the same time, the Air Force Chief of Staff reminded PACAF and AFSS that they sould assume that any ARDF/DSU (Direct Support Unit) operation would be a direct support function, with OPCON delegated to 7/13AF. CAS requirements for DF/COMINT collection would be handled as of the highest priority, operational considerations permitting. That is, the Air Force would not consider placing the DXU/ARDF operation directly under CAS OPCON, but would instead operate on the primise that deployment of unit aircraft was primarily to support CAS requirements.

The reason why it was necessary for ARDF aircraft to operate out of Thai bases was simply that South Vietnam-based EC-47's did not have the loiter time to cover the North Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll areas with any degree of effectiveness and most of their flying time would be spent in transit to and from target areas. Admittedly, Pleiku-based EC-47's could be the closest to the target areas in Laos, but the 2,500' elevation and considerations of flying safety acted to limit the planes gross weight. The aircraft could not launch with a full fuel load and retain single-engine capability if and engine failed on takeoff. Sea-level-based aircraft, such as those then based at Nha Trang, could carry the fuel, but would have to fly nearly 300 miles further, to and from target areas, a circumstance which nullified the fuel-load advantage.

Operational considerations were, however, not the only factor affecting the decision as to whether EC-47's should or should not be based in Thailand. Diplomatic concern was also evinced at high level of both the U.S. and Thai governments. In a lengthy discussion at Udorn on 27 February 1969, the purpose and concept of Commando Forge operations were explained in detail to Ambassador Unger. He in turn explained that much of the problem lay in Royal Thai Government sensitivity concerning the increase in the number of U.S. cryptolic personnel in Thailand, as well as the fact that Air Vice Marshal Dawee already considered the Task Force Alpha/Infiltration Surveillance Center (TFA/ISC) complex at Nakhon Phanom a "spook outfit". After it was explained to the Ambassador that Commmando Forge activities would not duplicate any existing collection capability or analysis facility, but would, rather replace and improve the current EC-47 collection progarm for Laos which had to operate out of RVN, he gave his solit support to the program. He stated the would have his staff study the problem of how best to present the case to the RTG, including possible visits to TFA by key Thai officials, and depiction of Commando Forge as an operation "in direct support of the tactical commander," with and "spook" aspect played down.

With the diplomatic problems eased, one continuing problem area remained, that of headroom in Thailand. The Royal Thai Government was adamant about the number of U.S. servicemen allowed in-country, and even at that time was contemplating a force reduction. Several solutions were offered - most of them involving tradeoffs with other Thai-based units or U.S. Army aviation spaces and elimination of lower priority spaces to accomodate the necessary 144 manpower spaces and three aircraft. Quite naturally, no one wanted to hurt his own opertion by giving up spaces; so for some time the matter was a standoff. Fortunately, management action reducing EB-66 quarterly flying hours by approximately 1,000 hours generated sufficient manpower headroom without increasing the USAF Thailand ceiling, and so opened the way for Commando Forge deployment.

Detachment 2, 460th Tac Recon Wing, was established at Nakhon Phanom on 6 April 1969 ( under operational control of MACV) with three EC-47's. This force was augmented intermittently throughout 1969 and early 1970 with two TDY aircraft, and was enlarged to as many as seven during periods of critical interest. On 27 April 1970, final approval was received to man five EC-47N/P aircraft at Nakhon Phanom on a PCS basis. This gave Commando Forge ARDF/SIGINT coverage over most of the permissive Barrel Roll and western Steel Tiger areas. Effective 1 June 1970, Det 2, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, was inactivated; simultaneously, Det 1, 360th Tactical Electronics Warfare Squadron, was activated at Nakhon Phanom, taking over the personnel and equipment of the former.