CHAPTER ONECOMMAND AND CONTROLFRAGGING PROCESS The issuance of fragmetary orders for Combat Cross/Commando Forge aircraft was done on a daily basis by Hq 7AF DOCRS, based on the weekly tasking message from the ACC. Prior to late spring of 1970 this was done manually; however, as of 4 April 1970, the daily frag order was processed through the Seek Data II 1130/360 computer systems. A test run, starting 21 March and ending 3 April, was made using both the automated and manual systems to identify and correct any deficiencies in the new process. From that time on, the daily fragmentary order was processed and released by Hq 7AF no later than 0900H, using AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Netword) as the primary method of transmission. If transmission by AUTODIN was not possible within three hours, the frag order was transmitted by teletype. The goal was to frag for a 75 percent rate for the 57 UE (Unit Equipment) EC-47 aircraft, but, in practice, fragging was performed on the basis of possessed aircraft on a weekly basic (some days it might drop to 60 percent, on other days up to 80 percent-plus, but, over the week, 75 percent was maintained). AUTHORIZED, ASSIGNED, POSSESSED - THE DIFFERENCE The difference between UE, assigned, and possessed aircraft must be stressed, since it had a significant impact upon th fragging process. UE stood for the number of aircraft (57) authorized the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing for ARDF purposes; in actuality, only 52 were assigned, as of July 1970. Of the 52 EC-47's assigned, on the average, seven-plus were lost to the units--being in IRAN (Inspedtion and Repair as Necessary), undergoing modification, receiving corrosion control treatment, or being ferried--and, in consequence, were dropped from the "possessed" category. This left an average of 45 aircraft to be fragged. Moreover, even some of these, although technically "possessed", were invariably down for organizational maintenance, battle damage repair, or tech order compliance, and could therefore, not be flown; thus it was evident that 75 percent fragging of UE aircraft was not a valid concept. With the concurrence of COMUSMACV, fragging was based on 75 percent of the possessed aircraft. This proved more realistic, in that it allowed for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance, training, equipment calibration, and functional check flights. The U.S. Army had a far simpler problem when it came to the tasking fan fragging process for its ARDF function, inasmuch as the 509th RRG had direct lines of communications to and control over its aviation assets, Direct Support Units, (DSU's) and crews, each member of which had a SSIR (Special Investigations Required) clearance.
|