Chapter 5COMUSMACV has directed his ground commanders to take prompt advantage of ARDF information. There is no question that they do so, either by ground maneuver, artillery fire, tactical air, or ARC LIGHT strikes. At the very least, they use fix information as part of their overall intelligence picture to plan future opertaions. One Army source advised the TEWS in March 1967, that in reacting to a fix passed to a ground force by the DSU, the ground commander operated with difinite criteria. For his purpose, the best fix was one with a radii of less than 500 meters, received in time to react, positively identified, and collaborated by other intelligence. The Army source's experience has been:
used for immediate harassment and interdiction (H and I) of the enemy, by artillery, naval gunfire, and tactical air. Targets of major suspected importance receive all types of fire or a combination thereof depending on the forces and means available." Fixes not acted on immediately usually did not meet the best criteria (timely reception, small radii), or fell too close to a friendly populated area. In any event, these fixes at least added to the commanders intelligence picture. Another Army source, whose experience had been in the open country near Dak To in central RVN, advised the 361st TEWS on 2 April 1968, that every priority target reported with a fix radius of 1,000 meters was immediately hit by artillery fire. Unidentified targets with a radius of 500 meters or less also were immediately hit. The use of ARC LIGHT (B-52) strikes against targets produced by ARDF and other intelligence is not entirely within the local commander's jurisdiction. COMUSMACV must plan their use in the light of his total picture. Precise data are not available, but SS personnel understand that 90 percent of all ARC LIGHT strikes were based at least in part on ARDF information. Some indications of this important role of ARDF in ARC LIGHT planning may be seen in the following detailed accounts of operations:
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