Chapter 4

Combat losses for the EC-47 have been minimal. The first, with seven crew members, was lost probably to grouondfire on 10 March 1967 in RVN. VC troups searched the wreckage before a USAF ground party could reach the site. Apparently, the large number of leaflets scattered around the crash site deceived them as to the mission of the EC-47. Enemy groundfire in Laos knocked out one engine and damaged the other on the second EC-47 on 11 March 1968. The aircraft commander managed to steer the disabled aircraaft for 60 miles to a friendly airstrip and crashland it. His action saved the crew; the special equipment was salvaged, but the airplane had to be abandoned. The skill of the crew also saved a third EC-47 on 24 April 1968, after groundfire in Laos punched a two-foot by four-foot hole in its vertical stabilizer at the point where the vertical and horizontal element join together, along with other damage. The crew brought the airplane to Nakhon Phanom Air Base, where it was repaired and eventually returned to service.

A Combat Tactics Panel coprised of representatives of the 460th TRW, 6994th SS, and the TEWS meet monthly to review their experiences, tactics, and ideas for improvement. After the second EC-47 was hit in Laos in April 1968, the 460th TRW commander effected a fourth protective measure recommended by the panel, whereby no aircraft would operate closer than three miles ground distance to known enemy aircraft positions.

Another aspect of the enemy's role in determining the operating context are his countermeasures against detection by ARDF. It is uncertain as to how much the enemy knows about the EC-47 and its purpose. As indicated earlier, he has been practicing communications disciplin based on his experience in fighting the French.

Insofar as enemy communications are concerned, SS unit personnel know that he uses mobile transmitters (carried on various vehicles), which are extremely difficult to fix. The enemy transmits in short bursts which reduces the chances of a "lock-on" by ARDF equipment. He changes either his frequency or power output frequently to hamper detection. By sending and receiving on the same frequency from two transmitters at different locations or by changing antennas, he might escape detection. Finally, if an U.S. or allied aircraft approaches too closely to his position, he may stop transmitting.

The period before the TET Offensive in early 1968 offers an example in this regard of what may be either and enemy tactic on a limitation of ARDF. U.S. intelligence analysts used ARDF information to fix the location of a NVA division not far from teh Cambodian border. However, the division actually was east of the fix and near Bien Hoa. Apparently, that division had left its transmitters at the border site.