Chapter 1

Tactical Reconnaissance Problem in SEA

The combat arena for USAF tactical reconnaissance in RVN and Laos has few parallels in Air Force history. Perhaps only the arena in which the Air Force's first tactical unit, the First Aero Squadron (Aviation Section, USA Signal Corps) supported Gen. John J. Pershings pursuit of Panco Villa in 1916 offers some parallels. As in Mexico, the operational environment in RVN, and, to a lessening degree, in Laos is permissive: there is no enemy air and little ground-to-air opposition. There were no fixed battle lines in Mexico and, except for such "set piece" actions as at Khe Sanh, there were no fixed battle lines in the Southeast Asia conflict. Villa and his followers generally were indistinguishable from the local populace; so is the enemy now. The difficult terrain and heat in much of Mexico probably are surpassed in difficulty by the swamps, or the three-layer jungle, and the volatile weather in much of RVN and Laos. The combat arena in Mexico and in this war impedes the accomplishment of tactical reconnaissance objectives. The First Aero Squadron largely failed in its task in Mexico, but did enough to convince General Pershing that an army without tactical air reconnaissance "is doomed to failure against one with it". This experience also marks the point in history from which the U.S. Army can date its interest in controlling in own aerial reconnaissance. In this war, technology appears to have produced a solution to the tactical air reconnaissance problem. The control of that technology remains in doubt.