Cap 09 was scheduled for a classified combat mission eminating from Pleiku AB, RVN on 7 June 1969. The proposed departure time was 0725 hours local time. Estimated time enroute was planned for 7 hours total flying time, which required a planned refueling stop after the first four flying hours at Ubon RTAFB, Thailand. There were 470 gallons of fuel on board the aircraft at Pleiku for engine start.

The officer flight crew was awakedned shortly after 0500 hours and was transported to the Squadron Operations building around 0550 hours. Neither pilot ate breakfast. The flight mechanic was awakened at 0450 hours and ate breakfast in the dining hall.

The mission breifing began at 0605 hours and was interrupted for approximately 30-45 minutes by (incoming) rocket attack. After the all clear signal and the completion of the briefing, the crew reported to the aircraft. Aircraft Pre- flight, engine start, taxi and engine run-up were accomplished. The crew reported that during the engine run-up the number one engine RPM drop on both magnetos was approximately 30-40 RPM while the number two engine magneto drop were re- called as approximately 50 RPM.

Take-off from Pleiku AB, RVN was made at 0755L hours. The flight crew recalls no significant or unusual portion about the first period of flight other than the failure of the airborne weather radar. During this flight the co-pilot left his position to eat his flight lunch and the pilot let the flight mechanic fly the aircraft for 30-45 minutes. During the GCA approach into Ubon RTAFB, Thailand, Lion Control notified the flight crew that the 362 TEWS Operations had extended their crew duty day to 16 hours. Landing was accomplished at 1135L at Ubon RTAFB. The aircraft was parked and the required engine shut down checks were accomplished. ((NOTE: A blanked out line here.))

Seventy gallons of fuel were on board the aircraft upon landing. The Flight Mechanics dip stick readings were 40 gallons in the right main tank, 30 gallons in the left main tank. Both auxiliary tanks were dry.

There were two entries in the AFTO Form 781A. One was for a stopped up urinal and the second was for a Bravo Malfunction.

A fuel truck met the parked aircraft. The pilot instructed the flight mechanic to fill the auxiliary fuel tanks and to add approximately 50 gallons to each main tank. The flight mechanic filled the aircraft with 490 gallons of 115/145 octane AVGAS which raised the total fuel aboard the aircraft to approximately 560 gallons. At approximately 1145L hours the refueling was completed.

The aircraft was closed up and locked and the flight crew was transported to the officer's club and the NCO club for lunch.

The flight mechanic visited the BX and a concession after lunch then walked back to the aircraft at approximately 1300 hours. At this time he completed a walkaround pre-flight inspection, opened the aircraft, checked the oil quantity, drained the fuel sumps and removed the control surface locks and ground wires. The flight mechanic noted a slight oil leak in the accessory section of number one engine but considered it to be of minor significance.

At approximately 1330 hours the officer flight crew members returned from lunch and BX shopping.

The co-pilot and navigator stopped in the terminal building for a moment, then walked out to the aircraft while the aircraft commander stopped by base operations to check on enroute and terminal weather at Pleiku. When the pilot walked out to the aircraft the co-pilot and navigator were taking pictures of an F-4 aircraft on the runway so the pilot stated that he would get on board and perform the Before Starting Engines Checklist and for the co-pilot to join him in the cockpit when he had completed his picture taking.

The co-pilot remained outside for a few more minutes then entered the aircraft and began buckling into his seat in the cockpit. By the time he had adjusted himself in the co-pilot seat, the Before Starting Engines Checklist had been completed by the pilot in the left seat. The interior of the aircraft was extremely hot and uncomfortable to the aircrew.

The engines were started using the aircraft battery as the primary power source. Transient alert personnel assisted the crew with predeparture procedures of engine start, gear pin, etc. The ground crewmen stated that both engines back- fired during the engine start.

At 1346 hours Cap 09 called Ubon Ground Control for taxi, take-off instructions. At 1348 hours Cap 09 was informed that they had made a wrong turn fro the park- ing spot and to make a 180 degree turn and taxi in the opposite direction. At 1350 hours Cap 09 was warned by Ubon Ground Control: "use caution, numerous vehicles on the circular". The co-pilot stated that the pilot was taxing fairly rapidly, but not in an unsafe manner.

The aircraft taxied onto the run-up pad for runway 23 and parked to the right of a static AC-130 aircraft. At this time the pilot stated that he accomplished a "modified run-up check". This "modified"run-up checklist omitted the Propeller exercise, Generator, Propeller feathering and Propeller Reverse. The pilot bled (unreadable) the manifold bleed valve, noted the manifold pressure reading at (unreadable) inches, the carbureator air temperature as about 35 degrees C and checked the magnetos on both engines. The flight mechanic used carbureator air temperature of 40 degrees C to assure the proper power RPM schedule.

The magnetos on number two engine indicated a 40-60 RPM drop and a steady 2425 RPM. The magnetos on number one engine indicated a 30-40 RPM drop, and a steady 2390 RPM, However after checking the right magneto on the number one engine, the RPM did not increase back to 2390 RPM. The pilot flet that the throttle may have slipped back so he reaccomplished the magneto check on number one engine. The second magneto check indicated a normal drop and a normal power/RPM schedule. This completed the engine run-up checklist.

The pilot called for the Before Take-off Checklist and began taxiing toward the number one position for take-off. At 1357 a minute after taxi from the parking ramp, Cap 09 notified Ubon Tower that they were ready for take-off. The tower granted clearance for take-off and the pilot called for the line-up checklist while taxiing into take-off position. (The gross weight of the aircraft was assumed by the accident investigating board to be approximately 26,576 pounds. The temperature was 31 degrees C, dew point 24 degrees C and field elevation is 405 feet. No form 365F was on file).

The pilot advanced the throttles to 30 inches manifold pressure, the flight mechanic switched the overhead inverter swithch to ON and the pilot released the brakes and applied power for the take-off roll. There was a momentary overboost of both engines to 49 inches manifold pressure and the co-pilot stabilized the power at 47 inches manifold pressure.

At 70 knots IAS the engineer, who was standing between the seats reported the power is good. He recalls the number one engine CHT as 230 degrees and the number two engine CHT as 200 degrees, both propellers at 2700 RPM and all indications normal.

At 80 knots IAS the co-pilot made a final check of the engine instruments, then directed his vision outside and put his hand down by the landing gear lock ready to retract the landing gear on command.

The pilot held the aircraft on the runway until 90 knots IAS, lift off was smooth and normal. At approximately 95 knots and 200 feet the pilot called "Gear UP". Apparantly, at the exact same time the flight mechanic, noticing a slow drop in manifold pressure on the number one engine called over the interphone system "we're losing number one". Crew members report hearing a muffled pop and a banging of sorts on the left hand side of the fuselage. Ground witnesses reported hearing the number one engine backfire and the aircraft veered to the left. The landing gear remained in the down and locked position.

The flight mechanic watched the manifold pressure on number one engine reduce to 10 inches manifold pressure and hang there for a moment, then drop. The pilot advanced the power on number two engine to maximum power and then feathered the number one propeller. The pilot also retarded the number one throttle to idle and moved the left hand mixture control lever to idle cut-off. He did not close the firewall shut off valve. The aircraft remained under positive control during this periond of time.

At 1358 hours (10 minutes after taxi from the parking area) the pilot transmitted the following message to Ubon Tower: "Tower, this is 09, we just lost number one, coming back around".

Ubon Tower cleared Cap 09 t land on runway 05 if necessary. The pilot began a slow left turn with the intention of flying a left hand pattern for landing to runway 23. At this time the indicated airspeed was 90-95 knots. The pilot ordered the wing flaps extended to 1/4 flaps. The flight mechanic extended the flaps to the 1/4 position, then went aft to report on the condition of the feathered engine. The pilot directed the co-pilot to begin the "clean-up checklist" for the inoperative engine. At this time the flight mechanic returned to the cockpit and handed the co-pilot a checklist opened to page E-2 (Engine Failure). The co-pilot began completing the checklist and remembered completing this checklist through item 8 (ignition switch).

The co-pilot stated on interphone "we're losing airspeed". The flight mechanic then said on interphone "we only have 30 inches on number two" and reached into the cockpit and tapped the number two throttle to insure it was full forward. The pilot also verified the throttle at full power.

The airspeed continued to decrease slowly through 90 knots IAS, the 85 knots IAS and the aircraft began buffeting slightly. The pilot said over interphone "check flaps 1/2". The flight mechanic said we can't drop 1/2 flaps" to which the pilor replied "I meant 1/4".

At 1400 hours the pilot transmitted to Ubon Tower, "Ubon Tower, this is 09, is putting the aircraft down in a lake, receive that, over".

The aircraft, indicating approximately 80 knots, descending and periodically buffeting, was headed toward the Mun River. The flight path carried the aircraft through some trees on the river bank and then into the middle of the 350 yard wide river.

Prior to impact, the co-pilot sounded the alarm bell. The pilot reduced the power on number two engine to idle. The flight mechanic moved to the navigator section in the cockpit, fastened his seat belt and placed his head in his hands on the table.

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Impact in the river was made in a wings level, nose level, gear down, power off, 1/4 flaps condition. Apparantly there were two impacts.

The first impact presented a skipping sensation which dislodged a few unsecured itmes in the fuselage area. The second impact was quite severe followed by immediate deceleration. It is believed that the landing gear dug into the water thrusting the nose down severly. At this point crew members in the rear of the aircraft reported considerable debris (parachutes, crew member kits, weapons, L.P.U.s, survival vests, etc.) flying forward through the air. The cockpit area submerged momentarily and then bobbed to the surface, water filled the cockpit area momentarily then subsided. The entire front area of the cockpit was peeled open and back down. The aircraft came to rest on the main landing gear in approximately seven feet of water.

Egress was orderly, calm and through the rear cargo door for the navigator and radio operators. Crew members in the rear of the aircraft were rescued by Thai citizens in sampans. Personnel in the rear of the aircraft were unable to release the aircraft life raft from its container. (** This line blanked out **) The crew members cut the raft free from its container with survival knives.

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After impact, the flight mechanic unbuckled his seat belt and went forward toward daylight. He reported a large wall of water filling the cockpit during the second impact. The pilot was just raising himself from the left seat. The flight mechanic jumped into the water from behind the co-pilot in fromt of the aircraft and was followed by the pilot. Both assisted the co-pilot to unbuckle his seat belt and realized that he was injured, held him in the water. A sampan came to their rescue and they held ton to its sides until the rescue helicopter arrived overhead. The co-pilot was hoisted on board the helicopter and taked to the hospital. He suffered a broken leg and facial cuts. Shortly thereafter the helicopter returned and carried the pilot and flight mechanic to the hospital. They were uninjured. Other personnel were transported to the river bank by the Thai sampans where they were met by the base crash control team and brought back to Ubon RTAFB.

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